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THE SCHOOL BUS CHALLENGE
GEORGE
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federal and state legislatures have been

reframing their legislative structures in order to make them more
responsive to the needs of the people arising from the rapidly changing
economic and social conditions of our times. Essential to this program of social reconstruction is the emphasis on the interest of the
state in the health and welfare of all of its citizens apart from considerations of race, creed, or color. Laws providing for civil rights, free school
lunches, social security, minimum wages, and health care programs are
but a few of the many examples of this enlightened attitude.
Mindful of this trend, eighteen states,' obviously impressed with the
salutary success of school bus transportation for children attending public
schools, have extended the state's mantle of protection to children
attending nonpublic schools. In doing so, they saw no wisdom, justice,
or constitutional inhibition in providing such an essential service for one
group of children while denying it to another group of children, all of
whom attended school in accordance with compulsory education laws of
this state. This sound progressive social legislation probably would have
encountered little opposition but for the fact that a large number of the
children benefited attend schools conducted by religious bodies.
Whenever legislation of this type is proposed, the argument is advanced that the measure violates the policy of separation of Church and
State. For example, in 1957 the Legislature of the state of Connecticut
considered a bill which would enable towns and municipalities to transport children to nonpublic schools if the people of the communities
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expressed this desire in a special referendum. Resolutions were passed by various
Protestant sects condemning the proposed
law on the ground that it breached the wall
of separation of Church and State. Opponents of the measure in the legislature constantly
advanced this argument, disregarding the fact that
the Supreme Court
of the United
States ten years
ago decided that
legislation providGEORGE E. REED
ing school bus
transportation for
children attending nonpublic schools does
not violate the policy of separation of
2
Church and State.
The Everson Decision
Although the Everson case was decided
but twelve years ago, it is already corroded
by confusion. It is, therefore, necessary to
re-examine the Court's holding in order to
secure a clear understanding of this key
decision. The Supreme Court was confronted with the allegation that a New
Jersey statute, extending free school bus
transportation to children attending public
and nonprofit private schools, violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
federal constitution. With respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was alleged
that the state took public property and bestowed it on others to be used for their
private purposes. In response to this argument, the Court stated:
It is much too late to argue that legislation
2 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no
public purpose. (Cochran v. Louisiana
State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370.)3
The public purpose character of transportation legislation is no longer an open
one.
The First Amendment argument was
predicated on the proposition that public
money was being used to support church
schools, and thus violated the alleged guarantee of separation of Church and State of
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
broadly interpreted the clause of the First
Amendment forbidding an establishment of
religion, saying:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re4
ligion over another.
The Court then examined the New Jersey
law in light of this interpretation and reasoned that
...other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its
citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans . . . or the

members of any other faith, because of
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the

benefits of public welfare legislation. 5
The Court observed that the legislation
helps the children to get to school, just as
the policeman at a busy intersection protects children going to and from a parochial
school. It did not conclude that the state
is engaged in the direct support of parochial schools, but on the other hand decided:
The State contributes no money to the
schools. It does not support them. Its legis3 Id. at 7.
4 Id. at 15.
5 Id. at 16.
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lation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion,
safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.
The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. .

.

. New Jersey

has not breached it here.6

This decision is not equivocal. It squarely
holds that legislation designed to transport
children to and from parochial schools does
not involve a violation of the policy of separation of Church and State. Opponents of
such legislation consistently ignore this fact.
Yet, it is of the essence of the decision,
and may and should be quoted as the authoritative statement on this issue.
Second, the Court fully analyzes the
questions as to whether transportation legislation supports parochial schools. It concludes that it does not, but on the contrary
merely helps parents discharge their duty
of complying with the compulsory education laws. These statutes were enacted at a
time when traffic hazards were, comparatively speaking, at a minimum. Today, with
increased hazards, transportation legislation is more than ever a necessary implementation of compulsory education laws.
A contrary decision would render nugatory the parental right recognized in the
Oregon School Case 7 particularly with
respect to parents whose children live in
remote or highly congested districts. It is
significant that the Court cited the Oregon
School Case in connection with its evaluation of the impact of the compulsory education laws. It is quite logical to conclude
from these premises that the State has the
responsibility of providing a safe means of
transportation for all children attending
6
7

Id. at 18.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

recognized schools under compulsion of
law. The Court, however, did not go this
far. For instance, Justice Black in speaking for the Court said: "[W]e do not mean
to intimate that a state could not provide
transportation only to children attending
...
8
public schools.
In short, the Court recognized the right,
but not the duty to provide transportation
for all children in similar situations. Some
advocates of free school bus transportation have failed to recognize this anomalous
limitation in the Everson case, with the result that actions have been brought to force
school boards to extend transportation service in the absence of essential enabling legislation. Uniformly, the courts have ruled
adversely, the latest case being School District v. Houghton.9
There is every reason to believe that state
courts will continue to rule that there must
be enabling legislation before a school
board is warranted in transporting students,
even public school students, for school
boards may only exercise delegated authority.
Latest Decision in Maine
The extent to which this rule applies to
municipalities is currently the subject of
interesting litigation in the state of Maine.
The city of Augusta, relying on the proposition that it, unlike a school board, has authority to legislate for the welfare and safety
of the community, adopted an ordinance
providing for transportation of nonpublic
school children. The ordinance was challenged in the case of Squires v. City of
Augusta. The Superior Court upheld the
8 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16

(1947).
9 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956). See also Connell v. Board of School Directors, 356 Pa. 585, 52

A.2d 645 (1947).
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ordinance and the case is now pending on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Maine.
This is the first time an issue of this nature
has been before the courts.
Although the legislative road is frequently a long one, it affords the best prospect of ultimate success, especially if the
legislation is carefully drafted. The Everson
decision, for instance, will not prevent a
state court from holding that transportation
legislation is unconstitutional if there is a
violation of a particular provision of a state
constitution. For example, most states have
constitutional provisions which limit certain school funds to public school use. Legislation, therefore, which authorizes the use
of such funds for transportation of children to nonpublic schools is often vulnerable. The latest case illustrating this point
is McVey v. Hawkins. 10 The state of
Missouri amended its transportation statute
in 1939 by adding the following provisions:
[P]rovided, that this section shall include
pupils attending private schools of elementary and high school grade except such
schools as are operated for profit."
[Pirovided . ... that for the transportation
of pupils attending private schools, between
the ages of six and twenty years, where no
tuition shall be payable, the costs of transporting said pupils attending private school
shall be paid as herein provided for the
12
transportation of pupils to public schools.
For many years children were transported under the authority of this laws In
1952 the law was challenged. It was argued,
among other things, that the constitution of
the state of Missouri provided that the
fund upon which the transportation statute
was dependent was to ". . . be faithfully
appropriated for establishing and maintainMo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953).
11Mo. ANN. STAT. § 165.140 (1949).
10 364

12Mo. ANN. STAT.

§ 165.143 (1949).
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ing free public schools, and for no other
'3
uses or purposes whatsoever.'
The Missouri court held that the amendment extending transportation to nonpublic schools resulted in the use of money for
purposes other than the support and maintenance of public schools; consequently the
whole transportation statute was invalidated.
Another example occurred in Kentucky
in the case of Sherrard v. Board of Educ."1
The highest court of the state held that, an
action extending transportation to nonpublic
school children was unconstitutional, since
the implementation of the statute was dependent upon the use of funds reserved by
the constitution to public schools. The next
year the legislature enacted a new transportation law,15 which in many respects is a
model one. The enacting clause is preceded
by a preamble consisting of five short
paragraphs setting forth the need for the
legislation.' 6 The substantive portion of the
law extends free school bus transportation
to children attending nonpublic school.
Moreover, it provides that the money to
support such transportation shall be appropriated from general funds. The statute
was immediately challenged. This time the
high court of Kentucky upheld the law since
it was not dependent on a public school
17
fund.
A Problem of Social Justice
Concerning the other issues raised, the
Kentucky court declared:
In this advanced and enlightened age, with
all of the progress that has been made in
13 Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 5.

14 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942).
15Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.115 (1955).
16 Ky. Acts 1944, ch. 156.
17 Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d
930 (1945).
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the field of humane and social legislation,
and with the hazards and dangers of the
highway increased a thousand-fold from
what they formerly were, and with our
compulsory school attendance laws applying to all children and being rigidly enforced, as they are, it cannot be said with
any reason or consistency that tax legislation to provide our school children with
safe transportation is not tax legislation for
a public purpose. Neither can it be said that
such legislation, or such taxation, is in aid

of a church ....

18

Undoubtedly this is one of the most effective analyses of the factors pertaining to the
transportation question. Technicalities are
brushed aside in the interests of social justice. The whole problem is examined in the
light of conditions which today confront
our children. Actually, the quoted portion
of the Kentucky opinion is but a paraphrase
of the preamble of the transportation statute. This technique of legislative drafting
is characteristic of the great body of social
welfare legislation enacted during the past
twenty-five years. Frequently the clear expression of legislative intent in the law has
been the determining factor in judicial tests
of the constitutionality of such measures.
Opposition to Be Expected.

children attending nonprofit schools. The
legislation was introduced to clarify an admittedly ambiguous law; some communities
were transporting children, others Were not.
All the states adjoining Connecticut had
legislation authorizing transportation of
children to nonprofit schools. Some of these
laws were mandatory. Over half of the people of the state were supporting both public
and private schools.
Despite these facts, the opponents of free
school bus transportation for all children
came within one vote of defeating the modest request. They succeeded in deleting
from the bill the general provisions relating
to health and safety. The legislation enacted
involved only transportation. 19 We have
already noted how reliance was placed on
the "wall of separation" concept in total
disregard of the Everson decision. Equal
emphasis was placed on the proposition that
the legislation would weaken the public
schools, which were described as a "cohesive unit." One of the leaders of the opposition stated flatly that the bill presented
"an inevitable conflict between the Catholic Church where the children are indoctrinated in one faith and the public school
theory."
In elaborating on this proposition, the
Chairman of the Education Committee of
the State House of Representatives stated:
We are for the public schools. All children
are welcome there. If any are to be withdrawn, nothing prevents, but any proposal
to encourage such withdrawal by financial
assistance should be met with an emphatic
"no.,,

Despite the intrinsic merits of transportation laws for all children and the skillfulness
of draftsmanship, invariably the proposed
legislation will encounter strong opposition
when introduced and every conceivable argument will be used against it.
A typical example of the type of opposition which may be expected was
demonstrated in Connecticut last year. The
proposed legislation was permissive. It
would have allowed Connecticut communities, if they so desired, to provide health and
safety services, including transportation, to

Though the proposed legislation has been
enacted into law, opposition to children
riding to parochial schools continues. For
example, the town of Newtown conducted

18 191 S.W.2d at 934-35.

19 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-281

(1958).
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a referendum in which the people voted
to have the benefits of the new law extended to all of the children in the community. This action precipitated litigation
designed to test the constitutionality of the
Connecticut law (Snyder v. Newtown). Complainants allege that it violates the state and
federal constitutions and that they will take
the case to the United States Supreme Court
if necessary.
A more forceful example of the refusal
of opponents of tle nonpublic schools to
acquiesce in the expressed will of the people is reflected in litigation just filed in the
20
courts of New York.
In 1939 the people of New York amended
the state constitution to provide school bus
transportation for children attending nonpublic schools. 21 This amendment was expressly adopted in the interest of the welfare of the children. The legislature, without
dissent, proceeded to enact a law providing
that when the people of a school district
extend transportation facilities to children
in the nonpublic schools such facilities shall
be extended to all children attending nonprofit schools.2 2 This law has worked well
since its inception. Recently, however, a
school board refused to follow it. The
Commissioner of Education ordered that
the board adhere to the law, with the result
that an action has been filed to test the
constitutionality of the amendment to the
New York constitution and the statute implementing it. Plaintiffs allege that this organic and statutory law is repugnant to the
federal constitution despite the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has expressly
20

Board of Educ. v. Allen et al. The suit has been
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passed on the issue. Like the opponents of
the Brown23 decision, outlawing school
segregation, the opponents of the private
schools ignore the obvious civil rights implications of the decision by the Supreme
Court in Everson. Apparently they will not
rest until a decision has been secured curtailing the liberties of children attending
schools other than public institutions.
In other words, even though health and
safety of school children are at stake, they
contend that the state may not take any
action which enables parents to exercise the
constitutional right of sending their children to nonpublic schools. The Supreme
Court, in Everson, was confronted with this
precise issue and, noting that but for the
New Jersey legislation, some children might
not be sent to church schools, declared:
"State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor
24
them.,
The Court gave a positive and realistic
emphasis to the mandate of "state neutrality," 2 whereas the opponents of free school
bus transportation for all children associate
neutrality with inaction. But failure to act,
in order to protect a right, has the same
vitiating effect as the deliberate denial of a
right.
In the last analysis, the argument is predicated on the assumption that all children
belong in public schools. This proposition
frequently is insinuated when legislatures
are considering transportation legislation. It
is doubtful whether such a narrow attitude
accurately reflects the conviction of many
communities. Let it be remembered, however, that this conscience may be tempo-.

filed in the New York Supreme Court, Albany
County.

23 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

N. Y. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
22 N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 2021 (19).

(1947).
25 Ibid.

21

24 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18
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rarily blinded by the propaganda of national
organizations. Invariably these groups intervene in these issues, even to the extent
of contacting all of the legislators and furnishing them with material designed to stimulate emotionally a fear of the Catholic
Church and its parochial school system.
Though of recent origin, this practice is now
quite common.
A Matter of Public Safety
Fortunately, there are also constructive
forces at work. Last year, for instance, the
Committee for the White House Conference on Education made the following
recommendation:
This Committee recommends that all
children, regardless of whether they be
enrolled in public or nonpublic schools, receive basic health and safety services at
public expense; the extent to which "basic
health and safety services" should go and
the-question of whether public school funds
be used to provide them must be determined at the State and community levels
to reflect existing laws and desires.
This more truly represents the attitude
of the public. The White House Conference arrived at this conclusion after a mature consideration of the issue. It evaluated
critically informed opinions from every section of the country.
Today, thousands of children attending
nonpublic schools are confronted with
ever-increasing highway hazards. The social
conscience of the American people has before it a real challenge. On the one hand,
may freedom, and on the other hand, discrimination in sharing public welfare bene-

fits, coexist in a nation dedicated to the
concept of equality?
The gravity of the situation calls for a
speedy answer. Prudential application of
the basic principles of the Everson case in
the framework of the judicially tested legislative techniques of the Kentucky experience provide the basis for the answer. In
applying the principles of Everson, the mistake of associating the decision exclusively
with the "child benefit theory" should be
avoided. When the Supreme Court held the
New Jersey law fulfilled a public purpose
26
and cited the Cochran case as a precedent,
it implicitly reaffirmed the child benefit
theory.
But in upholding the transportation law
against the challenge that it violated the
First Amendment, the Court went beyond
this theory. It based its ultimate decision
on the free exercise clause of the Amendment. This is the significance of the Court's
language: "... the [First Amendment] commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its
citizens in the free exercise of their own
religion." '27 This is the real strength of the
decision, the basic principle of the case.
In summary, we may conclude that the
New Jersey bus decision affords strong
support for transportation legislation; but
initially, legislation must be sought. It must
be framed with the state constitution in
mind and with full knowledge that it will
be subjected ultimately to a judicial test.
26 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7
(1947).
27 Id. at

16.

